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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SWEETWATER PROPERTIES, SBC 
INVESTMENT COMPANY and 
BLACKJACK TRUST, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
TOWN OF ALTA, UTAH, a munici-
pal corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 17064 
BRIEF OF TOWN OF ALTA IN OPPOSITION TO 
SWEETWATER PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Town of Alta, pursuant to Rule 76(e) (2) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, herewith submits its answering Brief in 
response to the Petition for Rehearing filed by the Respond-
ents, Sweetwater Properties, et al., in this Case on February 
2, 1981. 
Any possible doubt surrounding the judicial soundness 
and validity of the unanimous Opinion of this Court issued 
in this appeal on the 14th day of January, 1981 is entirely 
removed by the Petition for Rehearing of the Respondents 
(hereafter "Sweet-water"). The Petition for Rehearing not 
only mischaracterizes and misreads the Opinion of the Court, 
it misstates the substantive law of municipal annexation 
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under the newly enacted statutory arrangement set out in 
10-2-401, et seq. u.c.A. (Repl. Vol. 2A 1979). 
A balanced reading of the Opinion fairly reflects that 
it is a studied and accurate legal analysis of the Statutes 
on municipal annexation and that under the exigent facts of 
the Case at Bar, the right results were reached for the 
right reasons. The Petition for Rehearing has no probative 
merit, reurges, in part, questions that have already been 
fully briefed and argued, and should be summarily denied. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The contentions of Sweetwater on Rehearing break-out in 
three parts: 
1. Under the January 14, 1981 Opinion this Court has 
allege~ly misread and misapplied the annexation Statutes of 
Utah to hold that there is only one method of municipal 
annexation and that such can now be accomplished, under the 
1979 Legislation, with or without the acquiescence or 
desires of the property owner. Sweetwater argues on Rehear-
ing that contrary to such alleged view by this Court, the 
only methodology for municipal annexation is through or in 
conjunction with a voluntary petition for annexation filed 
by a landowner(s) under the purported auspices of 10-2-416 
(Repl. Vol. - 2A-1979) •. 
Even were this allegation of Sweetwater a legally sound 
interpretation (which it is manifestly not) of the annexation 
-2-
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Statutes of this State, it remains a mystery how such 
interpretation cuts in favor of Sweetwater under the factual 
merits of the Case so as to justify a plenary rehearing. 
Nonetheless, Alta does not demur to the legal argument of 
Sweetwater but will answer the same. 
2. That Salt Lake County Service Area No. 3 and Salt Lake 
City were "affected entities" requiring full written notice 
of the Alta Policy Declaration adopted on September 13, 1979. 
This issue has already been fully briefed and argued by the 
parties as well as closely examined by the Court in its 
January 14, 1981 Opinion. The rule is well recognized in 
this Jurisdiction that the reargument of questions that have 
been fairly and fully decided in the main Opinion will not 
be reviewed and answered a second time on rehearing. 
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1912}. 
3. That contrary to the Opinion of the Court, the pur-
ported "vested property rights" of Sweetwater in and to the 
zoning and building regulations of Salt Lake County vis-a-vis 
the Policy Declaration of Alta were fully and constitutionally 
ripe under the facts of the Case. 
Although extended examination is quite unnecessary to 
answer the arguments of Sweetwater, contentions 1 and 3 will 
be briefly treated. Argument 2 of Sweetwater is impaled both 
substantively and-procedurally by examination in the main 
appeal and will not be repetitively reexamined for the second 
time in this Brief. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT WAS CLEARLY CORRECT IN ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT THE ANNEXATION STATUTES OF 
1979 ANTICIPATE THAT UNOPPOSED MUNICIPAL 
ANNEXATION MAY TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE CONSENT 
OF THE ABUTTING AND AFFECTED PROPERTY OWNER. 
1. Controlling Law on Rehearing. 
The claim is made by Sweetwater in its Petition for 
Rehearing that the unanimous Opinion of this Court filed on 
January 14, 1981 misconstrued the 1979 Utah Annexation 
Statute and invented a new proposition of law enabling a 
municipality to annex against the consent of the affected 
1/ 
landowner.- In principal part such Sweetwater contention 
2/ 
was urged in the main Appeal.-
As noted above, Sweetwater is not entitled to a second 
debate on rehearing to reurge issues that have already been 
fairly submitted and cited. In the watershed case of Cummings 
v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1912) this Court 
declared as the controlling law: 
1/ See Sweetwater- J>~t_ition for Rehearing pp. 4-8. 
~ Sweetwater Brief on Appeal pp. 9-16, 42-44. 
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"In this case nothing was done or attempted 
by counsel, except to reargue the very pro-
position we had fully considered and decided. 
If we should write opinions on all the Peti-
tions for Rehearings filed, we would have to 
devote a very large portion of our time in 
answering counsel's contentions a second 
time; and if we should grant rehearings be-
cause they are demanded, we should do nothing 
else save to write and rewrite opinions in a 
few cases." 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Knox, 
300 F.2d 296 (9 Cir. 1962) put the issue in a more laconic 
manner when it observed: 
"It is obvious from the statements in the 
affidavit that appellant plans, under the 
guise of a petition for rehearing, to study 
and reargue the case anew. Such is not the 
proper function of a petition for rehearing, 
and an attempt to do as suggested is an abuse 
of the privilege of making such a petition. 
Furthermore, such efforts are ill-advised and 
self-defeating." 300 F.2d at 297. 
The Opinion of January 14, 1981 treating the issue of 
involuntary annexation of private property by a municipality 
was squarely raised by the Sweetwater Brief in the main 
Appeal. It is unentitled to march across the same ground a 
second time on rehearing. To that end, the Petition for 
Rehearing should be denied. 
2. This Court Correctly Determined That the New Annexation 
Statute Envisions Involuntary Municipal Annexation of Private 
Property. 
The flawed argtiment of Sweetwater is that 10-2-416, pro-
viding for a voluntary petition by landowner for annexation, is 
the sine qua non of all annexation under the 1979 Legislation 
-s-
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and that without a voluntary petition being filed by a majority 
of affected real property owners having at least one-third of 
the real property value, annexation may not be a legally 
accomplished fact. The trouble with that argument is they read 
Section 416 with myopic tunnel vision to the exclusion of the 
other substantive sections of the 1979 annexation Legislation 
and specifically 10-2-414, 415, 417 and 418 as well as the 
public policy proclamation set out in Section 401. 
In point of fact, the recent annexation Statutes cited 
above, read in juxtaposition (along with Section 416), contem-
plates three methods in which municipal annexation may be 
accomplished. Besides the traditional method of annexation 
under a petition signed by a majority of property owners having 
one-third of the value (as set out in Section 10-2-416), 10-2-414 
and 415 contemplates annexation by a municipality of abutting 
property without the consent and, perhaps, contrary to the 
desires of the property owner(s). That conclusion is all 
but axiomatic under an even-handed reading of 10-2-414 which 
provides, in substance, that a municipality, "on its own 
initiative" may adopt a policy declaration in conformance 
with particular requirements. Such declaration, under 10-2-414 
would serve as a basis for an ordinance of annexation provided 
there is no pr~t~st filed by an affected entity or a written 
notice and objection of the affected landowner under 10-2-418. 
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Following such procedure and upon a certified copy of 
the annexation ordinance being filed with the County Recorder: 
"* * * the annexation shall be deemed and 
held to be part of the annexing municipality, 
and the inhabitants thereof shall enjoy the 
privileges of the annexing municipality." 
10-2-415 U.C.A. (Repl. Vol. 2A 1979). 
Such methodology provides, a procedure on its own, 
without relationship to the Statute 10-2-414 upon which 
Sweetwater's argument hangs and falls. 
But the landowner, as noted by this Court at page 4 of 
the Slip Opinion, is not without recourse. If a landowner 
is in the midst of urban property development, objects to 
the municipal policy declaration to annexation, and his 
property comes within one-half mile of the municipality, the 
annexation process falls under a third methodology and is 
3/ 
subject to the provisions of 10-2-418.- That Statute is 
directly germane to this Case. Under Section 418, the owner 
may raise by written notice all legal and factual defenses 
"preventing an annexation to the municipality" after a 
policy declaration has once issued by the City. The landowner 
thereafter has 12 months from the filing of his written notice 
to negotiate in good faith and diligence the issues surround-
ing annexation. If an understanding has not been reached at 
1J If the property:Owiler objects but his land is not within one-half 
mile of the municipal boundaries, his remedy is objection before 
the municipal body under the hearing procedures of 10-2-414 and 
415. Slip Opinion of January 14, 1981. 
-7-
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the end of 12 months, property development may thereafter go 
forward as permitted by law. As this Court noted in its Slip 
Opinion p. 4, Sweetwater gave no written notice of its objec-
tion to the Alta Policy Declaration and desire to annex and 
undertook no negotiations at all, much less in good faith and 
diligence, to accomplish the annexation "in accordance with 
the legislative policies". Sweetwater can hardly claim that 
it is aggrieved when all that Alta did in this Case was to 
file a policy declaration in substantial compliance with 
10-2-414 which, in turn, invoked the provisions of 10-2-418. 
A rational construction of the annexation policy set out in 
the 1979 Legislation under 10-2-401 et seq. supports fully the 
annexation procedural methodology described above and the Court 
in its January 14·, 1981 Opinion so held. 
The attempt upon the part of Sweetwater to read 10-2-416 
as the sole litmus for any annexation under the 1979 Legislation 
is to ignore the plain legislative policy, and, in fact, would 
emasculate the pragmatic basis for a municipal policy declara-
tion of· annexation as plainly contemplated by 10-2-414, 415, 
and 418 in the first instance; indeed, those sections of the 
annexation chapter would be rendered moot. This Court has 
let it be known heretofore that it will not assume that the 
Legislature was engaged in idle penmanship in the construction 
of a compreh~nsive enactment. Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, 
Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 (1967); Howe v. Jackson, 
18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966). 
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The point of and answer to Sweetwater's argument on 
Rehearing is that 10-2-416 provides a method for municipal 
annexation upon petition by landowners. It simply inculcates 
the remnants of the earlier statute on the subject so that 
annexation may be pursued voluntarily at the option of land-
owners having a majority of the subject real property and 
one-third of its value. It is, however, an illogical non-
sequitur to contend, as does Sweetwater herein, that 10-2-416 
is the only method of municipal annexation and that voluntary, 
landowner petition is a statutory condition precedent to 
municipal annexation. That tortured construction reads 10-
2-414, 415, 417 and 418, as well as the legislative policy 
of 10-2-401 out of the Statute books. 10-2-416 says no more 
and no less than a voluntary petition for annexation, but for 
the exception of island and peninsula annexation under 10-1-420, 
shall meet the majority and value requirements of Section 416. 
The argument of Sweetwater is deficient in law presently 
as it was in the main appeal and should be swiftly rejected 
in this Rehearing. 
3. The Flawed Argument of Sweetwater is, in All Events, 
to No Avail. 
Even were Sweetwater to be granted its contention for 
the sheer sake of academic argument, it would not salvage its 
bankrupt positiori-on rehearing. The facts are clear that the 
only action undertaken by Alta was the execution and enactment 
of a Policy Declaration relative to the Sweetwater property 
n 
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on September 13, 1979. Sweetwater took no steps, under 10-2-
418, to object to the Policy Declaration or to negotiate with 
Alta regarding the beneficial facets of annexation. Such was 
noted by this Court in its Slip Opinion, page 4, of January 
14, 1981. Ergo, Sweetwater is without standing to argue its 
position on rehearing without attacking the constitutional 
validity of 10-2-414, 415 and 418. As this Court correctly 
noted, Sweetwater declined to and never made such constitutional 
attack. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY 
CLAIM OF SWEETWATER AS TO VESTED RIGHTS UNDER 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ZONING AND BUILDING REGULATIONS 
WERE IMMATURE AND NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED. 
Sweetwater argues on rehearing that its alleged constitu-
tional guarantees to develop their property within Alta under 
the latter's Policy Declaration pursuant to the same zoning, 
density, and use ordinances and regulations as existed in 
Salt Lake County was fully mature in this appeal. The facts 
of the matter belie that contention. 
Sweetwater commenced the instant litigation in the 
District Court three days before the Alta Policy Declaration 
was adopted on September 13, 1979. Sweetwater made no show-
ing at trial that--it either had any constitutional vested 
rights to develop their property in a particular fashion 
-JO-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
within Alta or that they had been denied by Alta any such 
rights. Indeed, that was the record in the matter for Sweet-
water had made no attempt, whatsoever, to either negotiate 
with Alta or to seek a determination as to the nature and 
extent of high-density condominium development within the 
territorial boundaries of Alta. Rather, what the record does 
manifest is that Sweetwater filed its action in District Court 
three days before Alta even adopted its Policy Declaration on 
September 13, 1979 claiming that the Policy Declaration was 
void, unenforceable and denied to Sweetwater its property 
rights without just compensation. 
Thus, on appeal from the District Court decision, this 
Court could not reach the issue of any alleged constitutionally 
protected rights of property development, for the Alta Policy 
Declaration, in its broadest scope, had not passed on much 
less denied any claims or alleged rights to property develop-
ment. 
It is hardly surprising that this Court should find that 
the issue of any alleged constitutional and vested property 
rights of development were not justiciable in this matter. 
Such questions were not mature on the main appeal and they 
surely are not on rehearing. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The Petition for Rehearing of Sweetwater in this Case is 
ill-fated and must be rejected. Most of its argument is 
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repetitive of the main Appeal and does not raise issues that 
were either unresolved or raised for the first time in the 
January 14, 1981 Opinion of the Court. A petition for rehear-
ing is not a ceremonial formality for a disenchanted litigant. 
The proposition advanced by Sweetwater that annexation, 
under the 1979 Utah annexation Legislation may only take 
place upon a voluntary petition being filed by concerned 
property owners having a quantified property value places 
such strain upon the legislative policy of 10-2-401 et seq., 
as well as ordinary commonsense that it literally reads out 
of existence the public predicate for a municipal policy 
declaration of annexation under 10-2-414 and 415. 
This Court reached a sound and fully supported decision 
in its Opinion of January 14, 1981. The Petition for Rehear-
ing of Sweetwater to review that Opinion, should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~~ ROBERTS. C ~JR. 
12th Floor 
Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Town of Alta in Opposition to Sweetwater Petition 
for Rehearing were served on counsel of record at the 
respective addresses indicated, by mailing said copies to 
their offices, first class mail, postage prepaid, this 
20th day of February, 1981: 
E. Craig Smay, Esq. 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
P.O. Box 2670 
Park City, UT 84060 
Kent s. Lewis, Esq. 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
151 East 2100 South 
Building 4 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
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